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I say that the mission of my generation was to win self-government for Jamaica. To win 
political power which is the final power for the black masses of this country from which I 
spring. I am proud to stand here today and say to you who fought with me, say it with 
gladness and pride, Mission accomplished for my generation’. And what is the mission of 
the generation, the generation that succeeds me now I quit my leadership? It is to be 
founded on the work of those who went before. It is to be made up by the use of your 
political power of tackling the job of reconstructing the social and economic society and life 
of Jamaica. This, then, is the hope of the future which can only be born of an 
understanding of the country today and what it thinks and what it feels.1 Norman 
Washington Manley 
  
On the evening of December 29, 2011, Portia Simpson Miller led her People’s National Party 
(PNP) to a decisive 42-21 seat victory over the incumbent Jamaica Labour Party (JLP)2, setting a 
new precedent as the JLP, only recently having anointed Andrew Holness to replace Bruce 
Golding as its leader and Prime Minister, turned out to be the first government in the country’s 
modern political history to serve only one term in office. The election results took many by 
surprise.  Most,  including the majority of pollsters and political commentators3, holding 
conservatively to the traditional rhythms of Jamaican politics, felt that the electorate would 
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 Norman Washington Manley, “Mission Accomplished: The Wheel has come Full Circle”, in Rex Nettleford (ed.) 
Manley and the New Jamaica: Selected Speeches and Writings, 1938-1968, Longman Caribbean 1971, pp.368-384. 
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 See “It’s Portia! PNP delivers crushing 41-22 seat defeat to JLP”, Daily Observer, Friday December 30, 2011. The 
initial seat count shifted by one seat from 41-22 to 42-21 in favor of the PNP when on the basis of recounts the 
former JLP Minister of Industry Christopher Tufton narrowly lost his South West St Elizabeth seat to the PNP 
candidate. 
3
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give the JLP another chance and that the decision to replace the controversial and politically 
damaged Golding by the young (39 years old) and reasonably untainted Holness would lead to a 
narrow victory. No one foresaw a landslide and while, in the keenly competitive waters of 
Jamaican politics, this translated into less than a sixty thousand vote and six percentile point 
advantage, it was nonetheless deeply demoralising to the losers. Equally surprising, was the low 
voter turnout, as only 52.7% of the electorate felt compelled to vote for one of the two 
dominant political parties or any of the few and minuscule independents4. This latter trend, 
reflective of a secular decline in voting numbers since the election of 1980, was nonetheless 
precipitous, leading to another record, of the lowest voter turnout since Universal Adult 
Suffrage elections began in 1944.  
These two features, the fickleness of the electorate and its willingness to dump the incumbents 
after a little more than four years in office and a possible unhappiness with both parties evident 
in the low poll are indicative, I suggest, of a broader discontent with the state of politics, 
indeed, of the political, in Jamaica. Ironically, this is consolidating at the same time that the 
electoral process in Jamaica is at a highpoint in terms of levels of organisation, transparency of 
processes and commitment to the system from the dominant parties - the latter most evident 
in the virtual absence of violence and evident mingling of opposing supporters, both in the lead 
up to and during the 2011 election5. In the year, then, of Jamaica’s fiftieth anniversary of 
independence to be celebrated on August 6, 2012, it is both the best and the worst of times. In 
terms of the system and the social acceptance of its results, elections and the political process 
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 See http://jamaica-elections.com/general/2011/results/index.php 
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 See “The Maturing of the Political Process” Editorial, Daily Observer, December 30, 2011. 
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have never been more universally accepted and legitimate. Yet, in terms of the saliency of the 
electoral exercise as a means of forging genuinely alternative ways of social and political living, 
there is growing despondency. 
The Dudus Events 
The political event most influential in determining the contours of the present conjuncture is, of 
course, what is commonly referred to as the ‘Dudus events’ of May 2010.6 On the day after 
Labour Day, May 24th 2010, the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF), supported by contingents from 
the police, breached, via a flanking manoeuvre the carefully constructed barricades around the 
Western Kingston community of Tivoli Gardens, erected to protect from imminent arrest and 
extradition to the United States, Christopher ‘Dudus’ Coke, self-proclaimed ‘President’ and 
‘Don’ of the community and erstwhile supporter of the governing JLP. The swift military action 
and the room by room search that followed led to the deaths of some 73 persons – an 
unprecedented number even in violence -prone Jamaica – providing fuel for a continuing 
controversy as to whether all or even most of the casualties had been combatants. What is 
uncontroversial, is that the stonewalling of the US extradition request by the Golding 
government, various degrees of obfuscation and dissimulation of the details to the parliament 
and public and the attempt to use the reputable US consulting firm Mannatt, Phelps and 
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 See for instance, Rupert Lewis, “Notes on the West Kingston Crisis and Party Politics”, paper delivered at the 
conference, “States of Freedom, Freedom of States”, UWI Mona, 16-18 June 2010 and Brian Meeks, “The Dudus 
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Phillips to lobby in favour of  delaying or even rescinding the request, had served to embolden 
Coke and his supporters, leading to the inevitable confrontation and tragic denouement.7  
In the months that followed and until recently, rates of violent crime in the country fell 
dramatically. There were, for instance, 700 fewer murders between June 2010 and May 20118 
compared with  the previous year, encouraging  claims by some members of the incumbent 
party that they should be returned at the polls, as it was under there watch that  the intractable 
problem of violence had at last been brought under control. But of course, it had not been the 
Government, which had resisted the extradition kicking and screaming all the way, but the 
insistence, not always behind the scenes, of the hegemonic power and the growing crescendo 
from civil society, that established treaty and the rule of law should be followed that eventually 
forced the Government’s assent and precipitated the action that damaged the military 
apparatus of the Tivoli Gardens state within a state. Thus, it is not surprising that even as 
murders and other violent crimes subsided, so too did Golding’s standings in the polls,9 until the 
moment on September 25, 2011 when it became clear that he would not be re-elected and he 
resigned in the ultimately futile hope that newer leadership would take the Party to victory. 
Questioning Sovereignty 
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 The subsequent Enquiry and report on what came to be known as the Manatt/Dudus events, mildly scolded the 
Prime Minister for acting ‘inappropriately’. It was sharply critiqued by the PNP as a whitewash. See “Report of the 
Commission of Enquiry into the Extradition Request for Christopher Coke”, http://www.jis.gov.jm/pdf/Manatt-
Final-Report-1.pdf 
8
 “Iron Fists Can’t Curb Crime”, The Sunday Gleaner, 19 June 2011. 
9
 A poll conducted in April 2011 found that 57% felt that Golding had no credibility in the Manatt/Dudus affair. Of 
these, 49% felt that he should resign and only 38% felt that he should remain in office. See “Golding’s credibility 




At the heart of the extradition controversy and the debates that have raged in the following 
months, is the fraught notion of sovereignty. When it was brought to public attention that 
Minister of National Security under the earlier PNP regime Peter Phillips had signed 
memoranda of understanding facilitating the wiretapping of Coke and that this information had 
been shared with the US, he was accused of acting against the national interest and chants of 
‘CIA Agent’10 – even more ironic given the JLP’s traditions of pro-American, right of centre 
politics -were directed at him from the Government benches of the House. Golding himself on 
more than one occasion alluded to and warned against outside interference in Jamaica’s affairs, 
suggesting that his insistence on Coke’s ‘rights’11 was in the national interest and even in the 
aftermath of the extradition and detention of Coke, rumours continue to swirl that other 
members and associates of the former government remain on a short list of persons likely to be 
served with extradition notices for various crimes.12 Most bizarre of all was the matter of the 
US surveillance plane, a Lockheed P-3 Orion that had been seen by many and was 
photographed circling the airspace above Kingston during the military action13. When asked in 
October 2011 whether the government knew about this, then Minister of Security Dwight 
Nelson at first denied that the plane even existed, only to be contradicted later by PM Holness 
who suggested, confusingly, that it was a military matter and thus outside the purview of the 
Minister of National Security.14 The inflammatory, verging on slanderous, accusations against 
Phillips; the inversion of traditional anti-imperialist positions, with the JLP seeking to claim the 
                                                          
10
 See Ian Boyne, “Downtown Bangarang”, The Sunday Gleaner, February 20, 2011. 
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 See “Golding Defends Dudus Delay”, http://go-jamaica.com/news/read_article.php?id=17315 
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October 2011, http://caricomnewsnetwork.com 
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high, nationalist ground; the Government’s subsequent obfuscation on the actual relationship 
with the US during the military action, all point to the need for a more careful, even forensic 
conversation on the status of sovereignty and its usefulness as a concept for small states in the 
early decades of the Twenty First Century.  
If, long before the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, Gerard Chaliand 
could have described the romantic notion of ‘Third Worldism’ – the idea that the independent 
states emerging out of the decolonisation movements of the Fifties and Sixties could build new 
Utopias – as a myth15; then pessimistic perspectives have further consolidated in recent years.  
Thus, Samir Amin, one of the iconic anti-imperialist thinkers of the Sixties, suggested in 2003 
that the post-Bandung South can be divided into three distinct components: the first group, the 
‘active periphery’ of East Asian countries is deeply involved in the processes of modern 
capitalism. The second group, consisting of India and many Latin American states, is also 
involved, but far more vulnerable than the South East Asian countries. The third group, 
constituting much of Africa and smaller states (presumably like the Caribbean) is locked into 
“…outmoded international divisions of labour”16 and therefore extremely marginalised in the 
contemporary world. If, in Amin’s assessment, even the dynamic peripheries remain vulnerable, 
there is little if any space left for the marginal countries, beyond the provision of passive 
reserves (armies) of unemployed labour for the developed economies. Equally pessimistic in 
proposing the absence of any room for manoeuvre by small peripheral states is Immanuel  
Wallerstein, who argues, inter alia, that short of what he describes as ‘radical alterity’  (Al 
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 Gerard Chaliand, Revolution in the Third World, Brighton, Harvester Press, 1977. 
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 Samir Amin, Obsolescent Capitalism: Contemporary Politics and Global Disorder, London and New York, Zed 
Books, 2003, p.18. 
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Qaeda, Iran) or the failed policy of direct confrontation (Iraq) the only ‘weapon’ that small, 
peripheral states have in their strategic armoury, is the somewhat ephemeral mass migration of 
persons from the South to the North, with the potential of these groups becoming a fifth 
column of support for the causes of the South in the centre countries.17 
Far more textured - perhaps out of disciplinary sensibility - in the appreciation of the continuing 
saliency of state, though I fear, equally pessimistic in conclusion, are some of the positions from 
the international relations establishment. Thus Stephen Krasner, in his argument for sharing 
sovereignty, develops the proposition that conventional sovereignty has three elements – 
international/legal sovereignty, or the internationally recognised right to juridical 
independence; Westphalian/Vatellian sovereignty, or the right of each state to domestic 
authority structures; and domestic sovereignty or the actual control of authority within a state’s 
territorial boundaries.18 Krasner’s argument, at first glance reasonable, is that the rules 
available to provide assistance for well-governed states are inappropriate for badly governed 
ones. Governance assistance and transitional administrative forms are inadequate and  
In the future, better domestic governance in badly governed, failed and occupied polities 
will require the transcendence of accepted rules, including the creation of shared 
sovereignty in specific areas. In some cases, decent governance may require some new 
form of trusteeship, almost certainly de facto rather than de jure.19 
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 Immanuel Wallerstein The Decline of American Power, New York and London, the New Press, 2003. 
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 Stephen D. Krasner, “Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and failing States”, International 
Security, vol.29 no.2, 2004, pp.85-120. See similarly, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge Massachusetts and London, 2000. 
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Aside from the evident hubris in the assumption of the common acceptance of a marker for 
‘badly governed’ and ‘failed’ states, the glib acceptance of ‘occupation’ as an occupational 
hazard facing developed countries,  is the even more hubristic reassertion of the language of 
colonialism in the use of ‘trusteeship’ as the descriptor for the proposed arrangement. I readily 
admit that Krasner has proposed exceptional conditions for his new arrangement including 
instances of civil war and imminent starvation of the domestic population, all compellingly 
reasonable; yet I suggest that in the permanency implicit in his exhortation to rewrite norms of 
international sovereignty is the dangerous reassertion of archaic principles of imperial power 
and dominance rejected more than six decades ago. It is perhaps appropriate to re-examine 
those principles and the momentous struggles to de-centre them in this moment of pause, 
before too rapidly marching down that hoary road. 
What, however, if the onward march of capitalist globalisation has so changed the world that 
the markers of power no longer pass mainly through the corridors of the state?  Susan 
Strange’s argument, novel at first, is now widely acknowledged that in the contemporary world, 
power has shifted upward from weak to strong states; sideways from states to the market; and 
that some power has ‘evaporated’, in that it has diffused and no institution is exercising it.20  A 
version of this argument is carefully elaborated by Barbadian political economist Hilbourne 
Watson, who argues that the ‘Techno-Paradigm Shift’ is completely altering the traditional 
notions of nation, sovereignty and citizenship: 
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Caribbean nation states have very little prospect of making it alone as separate entities in 
the coming century. National development strategies can offer little more than stillborn 
outcomes. Caribbean people understand that sovereignty offers them little beyond the 
symbolic. The Caribbean must grow beyond its internal limits if it is to grow at all. Since 
global integration is the wave of modern capitalism, the region’s leaders must think of bold 
ways to transform the Caribbean into a globally linked region. However, it must find ways 
to identify the technologies, skills and commodities to drive such an option.21 
Yet, in the interstices of Watson’s paean in favour of  the idea that capitalism has steamrolled 
the state, the nation and all such archaic constructs, is a clear and manifest call for an activist 
polity that will ‘grow’, ‘think of bold ways’ and ‘find ways to identify’ and ‘drive such an option’. 
What are these if not the markers of a modified, yet still potent and activist state?  And if, 
indeed, a new, activist state is required, what will be the purchase, the ground around which 
the significant majority will unite in this effort of common goals and a common future? As 
difficult as it may be to digest, the answer would seem to head in the direction of imagining22 
new national, or perhaps, trans-national projects that would provide the glue for new 
modalities of living and producing. Thus even if Susan Strange was absolutely right on the 
retreat of the power and room to manoeuvre of the state, she does not seem to have proposed 
its negation as a player on the chessboard of globalisation; and even if Watson is correct on the 
constrictions and complexities inherent in global supply chains, his conclusion, quoted above, is 
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Gautier Mayoral, Social Science Research Centre, Rio Pederast, University of Puerto Rico, 1995, p.78. 
22
 See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Verso, 
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far removed from the helpless stasis evident in Amin’s dismissal of ‘marginal peripheries’ or the 
return to trusteeship explicit, if presented as the exceptional case, in Krasner’s ‘shared 
sovereignty’. 
The somewhat simplistic, though I think important proposal that is being advanced here is that 
while it is possible to think about and identify  genuinely failed states, or imagine very small 
states that fall below the threshold to possess any meaningful agency, the notions of 
sovereignty and agency are more points along a continuum than absolute values.  From such a 
stance, the challenge facing small, vulnerable states is how to advance along this continuum, to 
accumulate, as it were, greater sovereignty in order to provide the widest range of policy 
options for the development and prosperity of the citizens who live within its boundaries. 
Auditing Jamaica’s Sovereignty 
What then is the state of Jamaica’s Sovereignty? Using Krasner’s framework, we can propose 
that International Juridical Sovereignty, though its saliency is and always has been debatable, is 
still very much in existence, as is Westphalian/Vatellian sovereignty, though the latter has 
historically been compromised. Domestic sovereignty on the other hand, has survived recent 
tests to its integrity and has, in the present moment, the greatest potential for enhancement. If 
all three elements are to be seen as interlinked and thus mutually enforcing, then sovereignty, 
writ large, might be advanced (or retarded) by movement along one or more of these 
avenues.23  
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 See Krasner, 2004, p.87. 
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Jamaican International/Juridical sovereignty is written into law, the country’s membership in 
the United Nations and numerous other international and regional associations. It has never 
been formally compromised and though real power has always resided in the Security Council, 
votes in the UN General Assembly still matter. Voting and statehood are thus not entirely 
ephemeral and Jamaica has shown a remarkable ability, even within the confines of the post-
Cold War, globalised world, to adopt independent positions.  Substantial cases include the 
opposition to George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq and to the ouster of President Aristide from 
Haiti,24 both of which Commonwealth Caribbean (Caricom) states stood together, drew the ire 
of the United States, but did not waiver. The interesting lesson that might be drawn from a 
regional perspective is that regional unity matters in the face of a potentially hostile hegemon, 
but the numerous votes of the independent small states of the Caribbean are also important. 
Unity enhances sovereignty, but unification might not always achieve the same objective.  
Westphalian/Vatellian sovereignty or the right to non-interference has been formally 
honoured, though there is a substantial body of opinion that suggests that the Manley regime 
of 1976-1980 was destabilised by covert intervention25 from the United States as well as by 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) policies that served to undermine the credibility of the 
government.26 More recently, it has been proposed that international and bilateral binding 
trade agreements such as advanced by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the European 
Partnership Agreement (EPA) severely restrict the policy options available to small states, often 
forcing them to pursue trade regimes that might prove inimical to the nurturing of productive 
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 See Ricky Singh, “Caricom Firm Against War”, March 27, 2003, http://madimc.org and Ricky Singh, Caricom/Haiti 
relations again on Tenterhooks, Jamaica Observer, 11 July 2004, www.jamaicaobserver.com. 
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domestic sectors. In the case of the EPA, despite widespread reservations from business and 
intellectual sectors, Commonwealth Caribbean countries waivered in the face of determined 
pressure from the EU and accepted an agreement which is only now being fully debated in the 
region. Yet, among African states notably, concerted resistance to the stock provisions of the 
EPA have led to negotiations with greater options for flexibility and compromise than the 
Caribbean case would suggest.27 The approach toward greater agency and assertiveness would 
seem therefore to be in the direction of maintaining unity at the regional level while developing 
a common technical capacity to negotiate in favour of those common positions that emerge. 
Recent experience with Caricom’s Regional Negotiating Machinery (RNM - now restructured as 
the Office of Trade negotiations (OTN), suggests that both these requirements must be met. 
The most complex dimension is that of domestic sovereignty.  Despite a healthy debate in the 
national media over the last decade, Jamaica is not a failed state.28 The country has been able 
to reduce poverty, improve infant mortality rates29 maintain a credible if stressed system of 
health care and provide a modicum of basic education for its population. There are caveats for 
all of these assertions, particularly in the failure to educate far more citizens to the tertiary 
level, but they are made as a counter to the ‘failed state’ assertion. Economically, however, 
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 Admittedly, there is a perspective within the region and internationally that concedes defeat, that the notion of 
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Jamaica’s performance over the last two decades and more broadly over the fifty years since 
independence has been poor, with periods of low growth interspersed by periods of stagnation.  
The World Bank’s 2011 Memorandum suggested that Jamaica rank 180 out of 196 countries in 
terms of its rate of economic growth, with an average growth rate of 1% over the past twenty 
years.30 Among the outcomes has been a wholesale exodus of human capital, with the World 
Bank estimating some 85% of the country’s tertiary trained population residing outside of its 
boundaries.31 Yet despite this reality, an overarching debt burden projected to grow to 150% of 
GDP by 2012,32 the World Bank’s conclusion is that growth can be ‘unlocked’ if a few critical 
and painful measures are addressed. The Bank suggests that the key factor inhibiting the 
country’s growth is low productivity, eliciting a multi-pronged strategy including reducing  
crime, investing more in education, removing entrenched ‘perverse’ tax incentives and moving 
away from the ‘enclave development model’.33 
While there is substance in all of these proposals, there is a prior and overarching consideration 
contributing to economic stagnation associated with the breakdown of social consensus. 
Elsewhere, I have proposed that Jamaica is in a prolonged moment of hegemonic dissolution.34 
The social pact between the classes that took the country into independence came apart in the 
Seventies as the Michael Manley regime sought to rapidly advance outstanding demands for 
social equality and inclusion. It was never put back together again and Jamaica has endured a 
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long interregnum in which neo-liberal platitudes of the ‘magic of the market’ and grassroots 
interpretations of the same, such as the crude materialism of the ‘bling’ culture, proliferated. 
This profoundly social and political collapse came with its important ethical/philosophical 
dimensions as common sense notions of right and wrong were jettisoned along with notions of 
the nation and a particular concept of the Jamaican national project, embodied in the 1962 
independence slogan ‘Out of Many One People’. A critical political dimension of this moment 
was the emergence of the Don and the so-called ‘garrison communities’ of the inner city.35 
These semi-autonomous fiefdoms were both a reflection of ethical and philosophical 
dimensions of advanced hegemonic dissolution as they were an indication of the failure of the 
formal state to provide the social and security needs of a significant cross section of its urban 
citizens.  
The 2010 Dudus events and the extradition of Coke, severely undermined but have not entirely 
eroded the emergence of autonomous states within the state. What it has done is provided a 
moment for pause, which has been further prolonged by the election of December 2010.  
Politics like nature abhors a vacuum and this moment could either segue into a phase of 
regeneration of the garrisons and even more intense urban warfare and uncertainty; or it could 
lead to a set of national conversations that would lay the basis for new social arrangements, 
new ethico-philosophical foundations and an enhanced domestic sovereignty that would give 
Jamaica greater manoeuvrability in the world. 
A Way Forward 
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I present my way forward as a series of theses: 
1. The severe damage to the Dudus-led Empire in 2010, the role of civil society in raising its 
collective voice against the apparent cohabitation between the government and the 
Don and the decisive victory of the PNP at the polls, together provide a moment for 
rethinking not only Jamaican politics, but the nature of the Jamaican polity. 
2. The fiftieth anniversary of independence is a most appropriate time to consider these 
matters and launch a conversation, a ‘Constituent Assembly of the Jamaican People at 
Home and Abroad’ that would look closely at Constitutional matters, the economy, 
terms of social engagement and the philosophical underpinnings of the society.36 
3. The philosophical question needs special attention. It is a patently false assumption that 
there is a common set of precepts that unites Jamaica. The debate that emerged 
following the publication of excerpts from the diary of a notorious gunman, Cedric 
‘Doggy’ Murray, leader of the Stone crusher gang in 2010, is noteworthy.37  Doggy’s 
musings suggested a seamless intermingling of Old Testament religiosity with murder to 
avenge perceived social inequality, a view often voiced in different ways by many 
dancehall deejays. Similarly, the 2010 LAPOP study of Political Culture and Democracy in 
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Jamaica found that in assessing support for the political system on a 100 point index, 
“Jamaica’s 48.6 points score places it close to the bottom of the chart”.38  
4. A new philosophical conversation would have to address questions of social equality; 
place on the agenda lingering matters such as pervasive but subtle forms of colour 
discrimination that has led numerous persons to bleach their skins; confront the blatant 
homophobia that has grown in the past decade; and give due respect in appropriate 
institutional ways to patwa, the despised but irrepressible language of the majority 
which is simultaneously and ironically the gold sealed signature of Jamaica to the rest of 
the world. It would have to consider an entirely new definition of the nation that is 
sensitive to the fact that half of all Jamaicans live elsewhere while still considering 
themselves integrally part of ‘The nation’. This ‘long distance nationalism’39 packed with 
cultural, political, social and economic implications and contradictions, is critical to 
understand in any conversation surrounding the renaissance of a vibrant Jamaican and 
Caribbean project. 
5. Such a conversation would lead to a discussion of the necessary reforms in the political 
system that would learn from those successes that already exist, such as the Electoral 
Commission of Jamaica, which has been successful in finding a way to bring together the 
dominant political parties and members of civil society in a common programme that 
has largely ended corruption and violence in the electoral process. It would have to 
address matters associated with the deepening of democracy, such as phasing out the 
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unelected Senate and introducing principles of recall for non-performing members of 
parliament. 
6. Similarly, the conversation and its resolution in a clear political direction for the future, 
would lay the foundation for a parallel economic discourse that would explain structural 
and fiscal limitations, propose democratic approaches to the balancing and sharing of 
sacrifices across social sectors and suggest an economic path for the next fifty years. 
7. The regional agenda is closely tied up with this. Gilbert Roberts, Bishop and Payne and 
many others have lamented the failure of Caribbean states to shed island sovereignty 
more rapidly in favour of a shared regional sovereignty that would enhance prospects 
for autonomy and development.40 If the argument advanced here is substantial, then it 
is evident that in order for Jamaica to participate effectively in a shared arrangement of 
sovereignty at the regional level, it must resolve critical matters related to domestic 
sovereignty in the national space. While one agenda need not be stalled until the other 
is completed, it is fair to say that the national takes precedence over the regional and 
will bring it crashing to the ground as in the past with Federation, if it is not largely 
resolved before the latter. 
Conclusion: Guerrilla Sovereignty 
The flaw in most discussions on globalisation and the demise of the state and sovereignty is the 
failure to properly account for the pesky persistence of states in the contemporary world. While 
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 See Terri-Ann Gilbert Roberts, The Dynamics of Regional Governance: The Caribbean Community (Caricom) 
Experience in a context of Sovereignty Paradox, PhD Thesis Department of Politics, Sheffield University, July 2010 
and Matthew Louis Bishop and Anthony Payne, Caribbean Regional Governance and the Sovereignty/Statehood 
Problem, The Centre for International Governance Innovation, Paper no.8, February 2010 
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Whither Nationalism 
it is true that there are states that reasonably qualify as failed and others that barely survive 
without aid and international assistance of various kinds, many more persist with varying levels 
of prosperity within the world system. If this is true it would be neglectful, to say the least, to 
end the discussion at the point of recognition of the severe obstacles in the path of small 
resource poor states in the contemporary global order. Instead, what is required, is the 
necessary discussion as to how to build the appropriate alliances within the state;  consider the 
philosophical questions that might be appropriate in forging a common ethos, in forging a new, 
inclusive notion of the nation, cognizant of the importance of long-distance nationalism, 
advance for the widest discussion and national approval a suite of achievable mid-term 
objectives; forge the appropriate alliances with regional neighbours that face similar obstacles 
and share common objectives and proceed to bob and weave through the underbrush of the 
globalised world, using a sort of guerrilla sovereignty to seek, against the odds to improve the 
social and economic lives of the majority within the national space for Jamaica and beyond a 
future Caribbean alliance. 
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